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Mock Juries, Real Trials--- Journal of Law and Society
Defends a new method for researching jury performance, in light of troubling disagreement about whether juries are making errors due to rape myths. (Pre print)

Jury Reform and Live Deliberation Research--- Amicus Curiae
A brief summary of two ideas to fix current issues with jury research. (Manuscript)

Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible? --- The Philosophical Quarterly
Argues that we should use different standards of proof for different crimes, depending on how serious the crime is. (Manuscript)

A Plea for Real Jury Research --- International Journal of Evidence & Proof
Explains issues with the current ‘jury science’ and argues that there is moral imperative to allow study of live jury deliberation. (Manuscript)

The Foundations of Criminal Law Epistemology --- Ergo
Provides an account of why criminal law should care about the norms of individual epistemology. (Open Access Link)

Philosophical Dimensions of the Trial (ed) --- American Philosophical Quarterly
Discusses new work in legal philosophy, a special issue edited by myself, Lisa Bastian (VU Amsterdam) and Miguel Egler (Tilburg) (Open Access Link)

Profiling, Neutrality and Social Equality --- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Provides a new account of what is intellectually wrong with demographic profiling and proposes a response that avoids blurring epistemic and ethical norms: namely, to suspend judgement when faced with profiles. (Open Access Link)

Justice in Epistemic Gaps: The Proof Paradox Revisited --- Philosophical Issues
Defends the heretical view that we can permissibly assign legal liability based on statistical evidence alone. I show that capitulating in response to ‘epistemic gaps’—cases where there is a group of potential harmers but an absence of individuating evidence—can amount to a serious injustice against victims of harm. (PDF) (Publisher Link)

The Truth about Better Understanding --- Erkenntnis
Argues that strictly factive theories of understanding are consistent with the apparent role of false beliefs in improving our scientific understanding of the world. (Open Access Link)

Review of 'What is Political Philosophy?' --- Journal of Moral Philosophy
Book review of ‘What is Political Philosophy?’ by Charles Larmore, Princeton 2020. (PDF) (Publisher Link)

Legal Proof and Statistical Conjunctions --- Philosophical Studies
Examines the permissibility of deciding a legal case using only different types of statistical evidence. (Open Access Link)

Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence --- Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
Argues that purely statistical evidence can be a respectable basis for legal verdicts, argues against a popular analogy drawn between individual beliefs and court decisions, and corrects some misconceptions about evidence law found in recent literature.
(PDF) (Publisher Link)

Recent Work on the Proof Paradox --- Philosophy Compass
A survey of recent work in philosophy and legal theory attempting to resolve the proof paradox. (Pre-print) (Publisher Link)

How Intellectual Communities Progress --- Episteme
Develops a theory of collective inquiry and uses it to provide a cautiously optimistic perspective on progress in philosophy. (PDF) (Publisher Link)

Philosophical Expertise Under the Microscope --- Synthese
Provides a new perspective on expertise in philosophy, and argues that recent experimental data might provide good news for traditional methods. (Co-authored with Miguel Egler). (Open Access link)

The Virtue of Curiosity --- Episteme
Develops the first theory of curiosity as an intellectual virtue, considering what this topic tells us about broader issues in virtue epistemology.
(PDF) (Publisher Link)

Is Understanding Reducible? --- Inquiry
Develops a novel framework for testing ‘reductionist’ views of understanding and rejects the idea that understanding reduces to a body of knowledge.
(Publisher Link)